



PARA HACER BIEN EL AMOR CON UN **RAMSOMWARE** HAY QUE IR AL SU

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QUANTIKA¹⁴

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Sobre el autor

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- CEO de QuantiKa14
- Director de ciberinteligencia
- Profesor de cosas
- Vocal de APTAN
- Coordinador de la secretaría de investigación de criptomonedas y hacking en AIVC
- Creador de Dante's Gates, Guasap Forensic, Twiana, etc (<https://github.com/Quantika14/>)

APTAN



ASOCIACIÓN INTERNACIONAL
VÍCTIMAS DEL FRAUDE DIGITAL
Y CIBERESTAFA





¿Qué vamos a ver?

2022

- **Costa Rica** paralizada por el grupo Conti
- **LAPSUS\$** ataca a Nvidia, Ubisoft, Samsung y Microsoft. Son detenidos y en septiembre vuelven a atacar a Uber y Rockstar Game
- Guerra de **Ucrania y Rusia**
- **Conti** apoya a Rusia y publican los chats (ContiLeaks)
- **CSIC** y otras grandes entidades españolas atacadas

December 9Th, 2022

Currently tracking **117** groups across **187** relays & mirrors - **54** currently online

There have been **20** posts within the last 24 hours

There have been **126** posts within the month of december

There have been **758** posts within the last 90 days

There have been **4343** posts within the year of 2022

There have been **6684** posts since the dawn of ransomlook

There are **48** custom parsers indexing posts

¿En qué puede ayudar una investigación OSINT contra el ransomware?


Forensic + OSINT

1.1


Conceptos.: Cyber Kill Chain

- La cadena de asesinato cibernético (CKC) es una forma de exponer las etapas que realizan los ataques informáticos con el objetivo de saber qué medidas implementar a nivel de ciberseguridad.
- Podemos decir que CKC es un modelo que está compuesto por diferentes Técnicas, Tácticas y Procedimientos (TTPs).

La Anatomía de #WannaCry



1.2 Indicadores de compromiso (IOCs)



- IPs de CCs
- Nota
 - Urls
 - Wallets
 - TOX
- URLs
- Aplicaciones
 - Netscan
 - Mimikatz
 - etc
- Emails y adjuntos
- Extensiones
- Ficheros que crea
- Claves de registros

1.3 Atención a la víctima (cliente)

- **TOX:** es un protocolo p2p de mensajería instantánea y videollamadas con cifrado de extremo a extremo
- **EMAIL:** protonmail, onion, etc
- **Login + contact form**

1.4 Sus víctimas

- Tipos de víctimas
- La ubicación de las víctimas

Percent change in double-extortion attacks: 2021 vs 2020






Figure 3. Industries most impacted by ransomware groups in S1 2022. Figure 2. Publicly disclosed ransomware attacks by threat group in S1 2022.

1.5. Familias y grupos

2017	Feb	PClock	WannaCry	Erebus	PetrWrap	Crypat	Hermes	AecHu
	Mar	Matrix	Pycl	BTCWare				
	Apr	Poster	Ranion	Tiny	Everbe			
	May	Manna	Ferber	Jaff	Rao	Savant		
	Jun	Fairy	MacRansom	Erebus	NotPetya			
	Aug	Nubi						
	Oct	Magni	Pyrgen	BadRabbit				
	Nov	Phobos	Ordin					
	Dec	Clop						
	Jan	GandCrab						
	Apr	WhiteRose	BlackHeart					
	Aug	Ryuk						
2018	Sep	LimeRat						
	Oct	WannaCash	Scrobo	Dcrr				
	Nov	Stop/DJVU						
	Jan	Anatova	MegaCortex					
	Feb	Vega						
	Mar	JNEC	RobbinHood					
	May	JSWorm	Wesker	Maze				
	Jun	VoidCrypt						
	Jul	DoppelPaymer						
	Sep	NetWalker						
	Oct	Medusa	Snatch					
	Nov	Thanos	NextCry	WastedLocker				
2019	Dec	Lockbit	PwndLocker	DMR				
	Jan	Makop	Bitpylock					
	Feb	RagnarLocker	Conti	Cuba	Sorena			
	Mar	TeslaRvng	Blackin					
	Apr	WannaRen	Ransomexx	Sfile				
	May	Snake						

2020	Jan	Makop	Bitpylock					
	Feb	RagnarLocker	Conti	Cuba	Sorena			
	Mar	TeslaRvng	Blackin					
	Apr	WannaRen	Ransomexx	Sfile				
	May	Snake						
	Jun	Avaddon	GottaCrypt					
	Jul	EvilQuest	Fonix					
	Aug	Darkside	XmrLocker					
	Sep	MountLocker						
	Oct	Egregor						
	Nov	HelloKitty	CoronaLock					
	Dec	Suncrypt	DeathRansom	Cring	Babuk	Hades		
2021	Jan	Lorenz	Pysa					
	Mar	Quoter						
	Apr	Jesus	Qlocker					
	May	DiscoRan	Everest					
	Jun	Hive	Zikma					
	Jul	AvosLocker	Script	BlackMatter				
	Aug	Loki	LockFile					
	Sep	Chaos	Blackbyte	Colossus				
	Oct	Diavol	Prans					
	Nov	Polaris	Rook	Surtr	Sabbath			
	Dec	BlackCat						
	2022	Jan	NightSky					
Feb		Stormous	Krus	Hermetic				
Mar		Freud	Pandora					

¿Cómo podemos estar actualizados?

2. Monitorización

- https://github.com/fastfire/deepdarkCTI/blob/main/ransomware_gang.md
- <https://ransomwatch.telemetry.ltd/#/INDEX>
- <https://www.ransomlook.io/>
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fastfire/deepdarkCTI/main/ransomware_gang.md
- <https://twitter.com/RansomwareNews>

Group Name	Onion V.	Link
Arvin Club	v3	Open
Babuk	v3	Open
Black Basta	v3	Open
AlphaVM/BlackCat	v3	Open
BlackByte	v3	Open
B14ckt0r	v3	Open
CLOP	v3	Open
CONTI	v3	Open
CRYP7ON1COD3	v3	Open
Cuba	v3	Open
Everest	v3	Open
Grief	v3	Open
Hive	v3	Open
HolyGhost	v3	Open
Karakurt	v3	Open DEEP-WEB
KelvinSecurity		DEEP-WEB
LockBit 2.0	v3	Open
LockData Auction	v3	Open
Lorenz	v3	Open
LV BLOG	v3	Open Open
Medusa	v3	Open
Midas	v3	Open
Moses Staff	v2	Open DEEP-WEB
Pandora	v3	Open
Pay2Key	v3	Open
Quantum	v3	Open
Ragnar_Locker	v3	Open
RAMP	v3	Open
Ransom Cartel	v3	Open
Ransom House	v3	Open
RansomEXX	v3	Open
REvil	v3	Open
Snatch	v3	Open
Stormous	v3	Open
Onyx	v3	Open
Vice Society	v3	Open
x001xs	v3	Open

2.1 Crear tu propio data set

- <https://github.com/Quantika14/osint-suite-tools>

1	Target	Onion 1	Onion 2	TOX	Email 1	Email 2	XMPP	Web	Telegram	Víctimas	V-Spain	Twitter	Idioma	País
2	AvosLocker	http://avosqxh72b5ia23d15fgwpcndkctuzqvh2iefk5imp3pi5ghe15klad.onion	None	9A751AC90A5F020	avos@onionmail.org	None	avos@strong	None	None	41	1	None	Inglés	None
3	Babuk	http://nq4zyac4ukl4tykmidbzgdvlvaboqeqsamkp4t35bvjeve6zm2lqcjid.onion	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	6	0	None	Inglés	None
4	Bl@cktor	http://bl4cktorpms2evbrcyt52aakcxt6yn37byb65uama5cimhifcscngkid.onion	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	5	0	None	Inglés	None
5	Clop Leaks	http://santat7kpllt6iyvqbr7q4amdvdzrh6paatvyrz17ry3zm72zjg4ad.onion	ekbgzchl6x2ias37.onion	None	unlock@support-mult.com	unlock@rsv-t	None	None	None	70	0	None	Inglés	Rusia
6	HiveLeak	http://hiveleakdbtnp76ulyhi52eaa6c6tyc3xw7ez7lqv6wc34gd2nekazyd.onion	hivecust6vhekztbqgdhks64ucehqacge3dij3gyrrdp57zoq3ooqd.onion	None	Web form	None	None	None	None	166	0	None	Inglés	None
7	Lockbit 3.0	http://lockbitapt6vx57t3eeqjofwgcglmutr3a35nygvokja5uuccip4kykd.onion	http://lockbitapt2d73kr1rbewgv27tquljgxr33xbwvswp6rkyieto7u4ncead.onion/	3085B889A0C515D2	None	None	None	None	None	260	3	None	Inglés	Rusia
8	Lorenz	http://lorenzmlwpzqxq736jzeutevrytjueszsvznuibanxomlpkyk6ksoyd.onion	woe2suafeg6ehxivgvvn4nh6ectbdhdqgc4vzph27mmy7rjf2c52jid.onion/index	None	Web form	None	None	None	None	45	1	None	Inglés	None
9	Quantum	http://quantum445bh3ezuvilkdzs5xdepf3b7lkcupsvkvryf3n7hgzpxebid.onion	22rnyep2aa2exx3fdm26p4onwifmhciodb55v5i3w4iny7e5bxxp3vad.onion	None	None	None	None	None	None	53	0	None	Inglés	None
10	Ragnar_Locker	http://rleaktxuey67yrespmhvtmrqtoozur35lwdrup4d3ietbm3pupc4lyd.onion	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	81	None	None	None	None
11	Ransomexx	http://rnsrm77cdsirsdlbs4v5qoepu3px6sb2jgmh53jrx7lpcrbiz5b2ad.onion	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	60	None	None	Inglés	None
12	Suncrypt	http://x2mlyuiwpi2imir5kykngdu7v6vprkxhiltrk4qafvmtawey4qzwid.onion	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	20	None	None	Inglés	None
13	Vice Society	http://sso4zimieeanazkz5ld4v5hdibi2nzwzdlbfn5n5w4pw5mck76lzyd.onion/	None	None	v-society.official@onionma	ViceSociety@	None	None	None	152	12	None	Inglés	None
14	Moses	http://mosesstaffm7hptp.onion/	None	None	contact@moses-staff.se	None	None	@moses_sta	None	None	None	https://tw	Inglés	Israel
15	ARVIN CLUB	3kp6j22pz3zkv76yutctosa6djpj4yib2icvdqxucdaxxedumhqiypad.onion	None	D6164C90642CD95	None	None	None	None	https://t.me	None	None	None	None	None
16	Stormous	http://ahb6hjhe4nomfgwxequ52hazigh4ty4gdcnrf3r7z5tjyhour5py2id.onion	None	None	stormouss@onionmail.org	None	None	None	None	https://t.me	None	None	None	None
17	RansomHouse	http://zohlm7ahjwegcedoz7lrdrti7bvpofymcayotp744qhx6jmxbuo2yid.onion/	None	None	None	None	None	None	https://t.me	None	None	None	Inglés	None
18	Conti	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	Rusia

2.2 Analizamos con Dante's Gates

- /buscar
- /buscaremail
- /buscarusername
- /buscarip
- /analizardominio

<https://quantika14.com/dantes-gates-all-in-one-osint-telegram-bot/>



DANTE'S GATES

OSINT MADE IN SPAIN

WWW.QUANTIKA14.COM

NEWS INTELLIGENCE

3.1 ¿Qué es NINT?

- Es una disciplina de inteligencia a través de la prensa online y escrita.
- A través de diferentes metodologías se obtiene, analiza y se evalúa la información de la prensa con un objetivo concreto

Case	To Do	Export
Vice Soc...: Created December 9, 2022 3:38 PM Active Case	Pages viewed <h1>21</h1>	Searches <h1>7</h1>
Captioned images <h1>0</h1>	Selector matches <h1>0</h1>	Notes taken <h1>6</h1>

Selectors 0 **Tags 0**

+ Adding a new selector will scan all case files for the new selector. This may take a minute or two.

+ Add + Bulk add Export matches

Selector	Count

History 21 **Notes 6** **Images 0** **Attachments 0** **Searches 7** **Data 84**

History of all pages you have viewed for this case are listed here from newest to oldest.

3.2 Hunchly: diario y registro


- Es una aplicación perfecta para la obtención y análisis que hagamos con nuestra navegación por Chrome.
- Necesitamos instalar TOR2WEB

Showing 21 of 21 total pages

Sort by Newest

Search titles and URLs

<p>Zepelin: Russian Ransomware Targets High Profile Users in the U.S. and Europe</p> <p>December 9, 2022 9:32 PM</p>	<p>☰</p> <p>🗑️</p> <p>★</p> <p>🗑️</p>
<p>site:blackberry.com intext:zeppelin - Buscar con Google</p> <p>https://www.google.com/search?q=site%3Ablackberry.com+intext%3Azeppelin&qs=chrome..69157j69158.8940j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8</p> <p>December 9, 2022 9:26 PM</p>	<p>🗑️</p>
<p>BlackBerry Cylance web - Buscar con Google</p>	<p>🗑️</p>




3.2 Análisis de Telegram

- JupyterLab
- Tableau
- Graphext
- Comando /buscar de Dante's Gates
- Descarga gratis el estudio:

<https://quantika14.com/estudios-de-investigacion>

12/10/2022


3.3 Fallos (de ellos)



- Rastros de marcas o familias antiguas (emails, leaks, dominios, logs, etc)
- Redes sociales
- IoCs
 - Sobre todos las Ips a CCs
- Entrevistas
- Comunicaciones internas (<https://github.com/TheParmak/conti-leaks-englished>)

4. Vice Society

Zeppelin ransomware se ofrece como Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) en varios foros de ciberdelincuencia de habla rusa (XSS, BHF, DarkMarket, IFUD).




4.1 RAMAS DE VICE SOCIETY

“Vice Society is a threat group active since at least early June 2021, known for deploying multiple ransomware strains on their victims' networks, such as **Hello Kitty/Five Hands and Zeppelin ransomware.**”

“Vice Society es un grupo de amenazas activo desde al menos principios de junio de 2021, conocido por implementar múltiples cepas de ransomware en las redes de sus víctimas, **como Hello Kitty/Five Hands y Zeppelin ransomware.**”

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-vice-society-targets-schools-with-multiple-ransomware-families/>



“On October 21, the FBI notified OAG that it had seized an account belonging to HelloKitty, a **Ukrainian hacking group**, which contained OAG patient and employee files,” the Oregon Anesthesiology Group said in a breach disclosure on December 6.

The FBI believes HelloKitty exploited a vulnerability in our third-party firewall, enabling the hackers to gain entry to the network,” it added.

While the HelloKitty ransomware, also known as FiveHands, has been active since January 2021, details about the gang's possible location had not been previously shared or disclosed.

No mentions about their possible location were included in a CISA alert, an FBI IC3 alert, nor in reports from multiple security firms such as NCC Group, Cado Security, Malwarebytes, Palo Alto Networks, SentinelOne, and Mandiant.

With Ukrainian police successfully detaining members of the REvil, Clop, and LockerGoga gangs, along with others, over the past six months, it is now a real possibility that this slip-up from OAG might have tipped off HelloKitty's Ukrainian operators to the need to move to a new jurisdiction.”

“Con la policía ucraniana deteniendo con éxito a miembros de las pandillas REvil, Clop y LockerGoga, junto con otros, en los últimos seis meses, ahora existe una posibilidad real de que este desliz de OAG podría **haber alertado a los operadores ucranianos de HelloKitty sobre la necesidad de trasladarse a una nueva jurisdicción.**”

<https://therecord.media/the-fbi-believes-the-hellokitty-ransomware-gang-operates-out-of-ukraine>


4.2 Analizamos el logo



4.3 Analizamos sus víctimas

Víctimas	URL
CSIC	http://www.csic.es/
Jealsa	https://www.jealsa.com
	https://www.rianxeira.com
Vygon	http://www.vygon.es/
Vectalia Group	http://www.alicante.vectalia.es/ http://www.caldesdemontbui.c at/
Caldes Montbui Levantina Ing y construcción	http://www.lic-sl.com/
Maristes Hermitage	http://www.maristes.eu/
Amaveca Salud	https://amavecasalud.es/
Prosol	http://www.prosol.ca/

Empresas víctimas en España expuesto en la web



4.4 IoCs

Fuente: <https://www.ccn-cert.cni.es/informes/informes-ccn-cert-publicos/6690-ccn-cert-id-09-22-vice-society-neshta-1/file.html>

Ransomware		
Tipo	Descripción	Valor
Sistema de ficheros	Extensión de los ficheros cifrados	".xnxxx"
Sistema de ficheros	Nombre del fichero que contiene el mensaje de rescate	"ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!!!"
Sistema de ficheros	El nombre de este fichero es generado a raíz de la clave pública, y tiene un tamaño de 40 caracteres. Se utiliza para guardar información relacionada con el cifrado	Caso genérico: C:\Users\Public\[A-F0-9]{40} Caso concreto de la muestra analizada: C:\Users\Public\6F4B95343D2D76D10F87017F60B7235937F26A64
Clave de registro	Clave de registro creada para la persistencia	Clave: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce Valor de Registro: LicChk Valor: {path_al_fichero_ejecutable_del_ransomware}

Neshta		
Tipo	Descripción	Valor
Sistema de ficheros	Carpeta en la que los ficheros originales son guardados una vez se descifran. Previamente a su ejecución.	"%TEMP%\3582-490"
Sistema de ficheros	Fichero que crea para hacer una copia de sí mismo.	%SystemRoot%\svchost.com
Sistema de ficheros	Indica el ultimo fichero infectado que ha sido ejecutado	%SystemRoot%\directx.sys
Sistema de ficheros	Creado una vez todos los ficheros han sido infectados	%TMP%\tmp5023.tmp
Clave de registro	Clave de registro creada para la persistencia	Clave: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\exefile\shell\open\command Valor de Registro: (Default) Valor: %SystemRoot%\svchost.com "%1" %*
Mutex	Mutex creado para evitar que estén en ejecución múltiples instancias del virus	MutexPolesskayaGlush*.*

IOCs

5.161.136.176

TYPE	VALUE
SHA1	a0ee0761602470e24bcea5f403e8d1e8bfa298323122ea585623531df2e860e7d0df0f25cce39b2141dc0ba220f30c70aea019de214eccd650bc6f37c9c2b6a5b930392b98f132f5395d54947391cb79
MD5	fb91e471cfa246beb9618e1689f1ae1d
IPV4	5.255.99[.]59 5.161.136[.]176 198.252.98[.]184 194.34.246[.]90
URL	hxxp[:]//vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyard[.]onion
Email	v-society.official@onionmail[.]org ViceSociety@onionmail[.]org

HYPERBEAM Products Docs Pricing Book a Demo

Embed Virtual Computers in your web app

Open any third-party website or application, synchronize audio and video flawlessly among multiple participants, and add multi-user control with just a few lines of code.

Use Hyperbeam for free Docs

5.255.99.59 Regular View Raw Data History

General Information

Country	Netherlands
City	Soest
Organization	The Infrastructure Group B.V.
ISP	Liteserver
ASN	AS60404
Operating System	Ubuntu

Open Ports


22 137

// 22 / TCP

OpenSSH

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.2p1 U
Key type: ssh-rsa
Key: AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAUA...
t2vCEJ8u+58XfIagrVSOv...
An+kg5Uevj6884808v51...
094gau/v704umc10Pcm9P...
2Ks+e0FrvvG9p1ZT171W...
3uV15605TjK572K8LNP2T...
1CR1H76cR1S070+e13W/BH...
eU93Z+XRSk+...
Fingerprint: 581e4:3d1c...

Fuente: https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Vice-Society-actors-target-K-12-institutions-in-US_TA2022194.pdf



25

¿VICE SOCIETY = ZEPPELIN?

¿Analizamos las notas?



ALL YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED BY "VICE SOCIETY"
 All your important documents, photos, databases were stolen and encrypted.

If you don't contact us in 7 days we will upload your files to darknet.

The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key.
 We are the only who can give you tool to recover your files.

To prove that we have the key and it works you can send us 2 files and we decrypt it for free (not more than 2 MB each).

This file should be not valuable!

Write to email: brendaevans4454@onionmail.org
 Alternative email: warreinoolds77@onionmail.org
 Public email v-society.official@onionmail.org
 Our tor website: vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvct5belwvsuxaxsutyad.onion

Attention!
 * Do not rename encrypted files.
 * Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
 * Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to ours) or you can become a victim of a scam.

*!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

ALL YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED BY "VICE SOCIETY"
 All your important documents, photos, databases were stolen and encrypted.

If you don't contact us in 7 days we will upload your files to darknet.


The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key.
 We are the only who can give you tool to recover your files.

To prove that we have the key and it works you can send us 2 files and we decrypt it for free (not more than 2 MB each).

This file should be not valuable!

Write to email: DanKult@onionmail.org
 Alternative email: AmbroVirerra@onionmail.org
 Public email: v-society.official@onionmail.org
 Our tor website: 4hzyuotli6maqa4u.onion

Attention!
 * Do not rename encrypted files.
 * Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
 * Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to ours) or you can become a victim of a scam.



ALL YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED BY "VICE SOCIETY"
 All your important documents, photos, databases were stolen and encrypted.

If you don't contact us in 7 days we will upload your files to darknet.


The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key. We are the only who can give you tool to recover your files.

To prove that we have the key and it works you can send us 2 files and we decrypt it for free (not more than 2 MB each).

This file should be not valuable!

Write to email: [redacted]@onionmail.org
 Alternative email: [redacted]@onionmail.org
 Public email [redacted]@onionmail.org
 Our tor website: vsociet [redacted] .onion

Attention!
 * Do not rename encrypted files.
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*!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

ALL YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED BY "VICE SOCIETY"
 All your important documents, photos, databases were stolen and encrypted.

If you don't contact us in 7 days we will upload your files to darknet.

The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key.
 We are the only who can give you tool to recover your files.

To prove that we have the key and it works you can send us 2 files and we decrypt it for free (not more than 2 MB each).

This file should be not valuable!

Write to email: BruceBoyle@onionmail.org
 Alternative email: SylvesterJones@onionmail.org
 Public email: v-society.official@onionmail.org
 Our tor website: vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvct5belwvsuxaxsutyad.onion

Attention!
 * Do not rename encrypted files.
 * Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
 * Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to ours) or you can become a victim of a scam.

```
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!

All your files, documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted.
!!! YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!
All your files, documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted.
You are not able to decrypt it by yourself! There is only one method of recovering files it is purchase an unique private key.

Write to angry_war@protonmail.ch

Your personal ID: 126-D7C-E67

Attention!
* Do not rename encrypted files.
* Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
```

```
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!

All your files, documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted.

You are not able to decrypt it by yourself! The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key.
Only we can give you this key and only we can recover your files.

To be sure we have the decryptor and it works you can send an email: regina4hgoregler@gmx.com and decrypt one file for free.
But this file should be of not valuable!

Do you really want to restore your files?
Write to email: regina4hgoregler@gmx.com
Reserved email: pansymarquis@yahoo.com

Your personal ID: 1A0-ADD-AD5

Attention!
* Do not rename encrypted files.
* Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
* Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to our) or you can become a victim of a scam.
```

```
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE STOLEN and ENCRYPTED !!!

All your documents, private keys/passwords, sources, databases and other important files are STOLEN and/or ENCRYPTED.
You are not able to decrypt it by yourself! The only method of recovering files is to purchase an UNIQUE DECRYPTOR program.
Only we can give you this decryptor and only we can recover your files.

=====
Your corp ID : NW024
Your network ID : 26C-B77-F57
=====

Do you really want to RESTORE your FILES?

Write to email: alaahamid@protonmail.com
Subject: NW024 26C-B77-F57

To be sure we have the decryptor and it works you can send 4 crypt file an email and we are decrypt one random file for free.
But this file should be of not valuable!

if there is no payment, in 30 DAYS all your information will be PUBLIC.

Some of the data will be sold on the DarkWeb, and some will be publicly available for CyberCrime.
After payment this information is guaranteed to be DELETED!

Reserved email: srat@tutanota.com (only if master email does not work/not responding more than 72 hours)

Attention!
* Do not rename encrypted files.
* Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss.
* Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to our) or you can become a victim of a scam.
```

File Settings Keys About

- Save as application -> .exe
- Save as dynamical library -> .dll
- Save as PowerShell script -> .ps1
- Save master unlocker for current keys

Main settings Ransom note

!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!

All your files, documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted.

You are not able to decrypt it by yourself! The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key. Only we can give you this key and only we can recover your files.

To be sure we have the decryptor and it works you can send an email: _____ and decrypt one file for free. But this file should be of not valuable!

Ransom note file name: !!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT

4.5 Entrevistas



Sergiu Gatlan



Lawrence Abrams



Bill Toulas


Fuente: <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/tag/vice-society/>

"Why not?

They always keep our private data open. You, me and anyone else go to hospitals, give them our passports, share our health problems etc. and they don't even try to protect our data. They have billions of government money. Do they steal that money?

*USA president gave big amount to protect government networks and where is their protection?
Where is our protection?*

If IT department don't want to do their job we will do ours and we don't care if it hospital or university." - Vice Society ransomware.

de: Thomas [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@onionmail.org>
para: Mauro [REDACTED]
fecha: 13 mar 2022, 19:56
asunto: Re: Re: Interview / Proposal
enviado por: onionmail.org
firmado por: onionmail.org
seguridad:  Encriptación estándar (TLS) [Más información](#)
👉: Este es importante principalmente porque frecuentemente lees mensajes con esta etiqueta.

Mi interlocutor es Thomas, líder de Vice Society.

- ¿Cómo te decidiste a formar un grupo de ransomware? ¿Cómo nació Vice Society?

Por un grupo de amigos que estaban interesados en pentesting. Decidimos probar suerte.

- Argentina se caracteriza por ser una víctima fácil y también por ser un mal pagador (Caso REvil, Everest). ¿Por qué los eligieron? ¿Fue a propósito?

[Encriptar] al gobierno de cualquier país es un logro y además, siempre tienen documentos interesantes. Tardamos 6 horas para obtener acceso a cada pieza de infraestructura crítica y alrededor de 6 horas más para atacar. Seguro te acordarás que su página web estuvo caída más de 1 semana a mediados de enero.

- ¿Argentina intentó negociar o contactarlos? Si es así, ¿hicieron una oferta?

Hablamos con algunas organizaciones de Argentina en otras circunstancias pero no recordamos si pagaron.

- Su lista de víctimas es bastante variada, pero esta es la segunda vez que listan una organización latinoamericana. ¿Cómo fue su experiencia? ¿Las organizaciones de LATAM suelen pagar o simplemente asumen la pérdida?

No es la segunda ;), es la segunda que no pagó. Y sí, algunos de ellos pagan.

- ¿Qué planes futuros tiene Vice Society? ¿Planean continuar operando contra infraestructura argentina o latinoamericana en general?

¡Seguro! ¿Por qué no? Amamos lo que hacemos, y no lo hacemos solo por el dinero.

<https://github.com/MauroEldritch/vicesociety>

4.6 Análisis del código

```
1 char *__fastcall start_routine(void *a1)
2 {
3     int v2; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10B0h]
4     int v3; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-10ACh]
5     char *filepath; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-10A0h]
6     const char *v5; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-1098h]
7     char v6[128]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-1090h] BYREF
8     char dest[4104]; // [rsp+80h] [rbp-1010h] BYREF
9     unsigned __int64 v8; // [rsp+108h] [rbp-8h]
10
11     v8 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
12     if ( a1 )
13     {
14         memset(dest, 0, 0x1000uLL);
15         strncpy(dest, (const char *)a1, 0x1000uLL);
16         free(a1);
17         v2 = strlen(dest) + 32;
18         filepath = (char *)malloc(v2);
19         if ( filepath )
20         {
21             mem_clear(filepath, v2);
22             sprintf(filepath, "%s%s", dest, ".crypt");
23             v3 = try_lock_exclusively(dest);
24             if ( !v3 )
25                 goto LABEL_50;
26             if ( log_stream )
27                 fprintf(log_stream, "File Locked:%s PID:%d\n", dest, (unsigned int)v3);
28             fflush(log_stream);
29             memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6));
30             if ( v3 > 10 )
31             {
32                 sprintf(v6, 0x80uLL, "kill -9 %d", (unsigned int)v3);
33                 v5 = (const char *)sub_50B4(v6);
34                 if ( v5 )
35                 {
36                     if ( log_stream )
37                         fprintf(log_stream, "exec_pipe:%s \n", v5);
38                     fflush(log_stream);
39                     usleep(0x3E8u);
40                 }
41                 if ( (unsigned int)try_lock_exclusively(dest) )
42                 {
43
```

Zeppelin code

Depending on the options set during the building process, it will either check the machine's default language and default country calling code or use an online service to obtain the victim's external IP address:

```
.text:0042D7D3 check_user_lang:                                ; CODE XREF: malware_main+404;j
.text:0042D7D3      call      GetUserDefaultLangID
.text:0042D7D8      movzx    eax, ax
.text:0042D7DB      mov     ds:default_lang, eax
.text:0042D7E0      cmp     ds:default_lang, 422h ; LANG_UKRAINIAN
.text:0042D7EA      jz     short exit
.text:0042D7EC      cmp     ds:default_lang, 423h ; LANG_BELARUSIAN
.text:0042D7F6      jz     short exit
.text:0042D7F8      cmp     ds:default_lang, 419h ; LANG_RUSSIAN
.text:0042D802      jz     short exit
.text:0042D804      cmp     ds:default_lang, 43Fh ; LANG_KAZAK
.text:0042D80E      jnz    short check_country_code
.text:0042D810
.text:0042D810 exit:                                           ; CODE XREF: malware_main+4B6;j
.text:0042D810                                           ; malware_main+4C2;j ...
.text:0042D810      push    0 ; uExitCode
.text:0042D812      call   ExitProcess_0
.text:0042D817 ; -----
.text:0042D817
.text:0042D817 check_country_code:                            ; CODE XREF: malware_main+4DA;j
.text:0042D817      lea    edx, [ebp+System::AnsiString]
.text:0042D81A      mov     eax, LOCALE_ICOUNTRY ; LCType
.text:0042D81F      call   get_locale_info
.text:0042D824      mov     eax, [ebp+System::AnsiString] ; System::AnsiString
.text:0042D827      call   @Sysutils@StrToInt$qqrx17System@AnsiString ; Sysutils::St
.text:0042D82C      mov     ds:default_lang, eax
.text:0042D831      cmp     ds:default_lang, 7 ; CTRY_RUSSIA || CTRY_KAZAKSTAN
.text:0042D838      jz     short exit_
.text:0042D83A      cmp     ds:default_lang, 375 ; CTRY_BELARUS
.text:0042D844      jz     short exit_
.text:0042D846      cmp     ds:default_lang, 380 ; CTRY_UKRAINE
.text:0042D850      jnz    short continue
.text:0042D852
.text:0042D852 exit_:                                           ; CODE XREF: malware_main+504;j
.....
```

5. Conclusiones

1. **VICE SOCIETY** tiene un logotipo imitando a **Vice City**. Otros nombres que han usado también lo mencionan: **Vice Spider**
2. Encontramos documentos de CISA pero no lo relacionan al grupo con Rusia
3. En Hispasec hablan de que el origen es VEGA y este es el antecesor de Zeppelin
4. En un medio que ha entrevistado e investigado al grupo mencionan que tienen dos ramas: **Zeppelin y HelloKitty/FiveHands**
5. **BlackBerry** en un informe expone partes del código donde se puede ver que Zeppelin filtra por países y no actúa en Rusia, Ucrania, Bielorrusia y Kazakstan
6. El FBI tiene una intrusión por HelloKitty y el FBI los ubica en Ucrania
7. Encontramos muchos parecidos en las notas entre Zeppelin y Vice Society
8. En las entrevistas se les ve formas de hablar de personas norte americanas
9. Inicialmente ninguna prueba que indiquen que trabajen regularmente para el gobierno ruso

¡GRACIAS!

QUANTIKA¹⁴